Introduction

Outline of Talk
A mutual exclusion protocol is used as an example to describe the proposed solution. 
Informal Description of OTSs
OTSs are transition systems, which can be straightforwardly written as algebraic specifications. 
• I : The set of initial states such that I ⊆ Υ.
• T : A finite set of transitions. 
Reachable States and Invariants
Reachable States : Given an OTS S, reachable states wrt S are inductively defined:
• Each υ init ∈ I is reachable.
• • Each υ init ∈ I is 0-bounded reachable.
• • The roots are initial states of S.
• For each t y 1 ,...,y n and each y k for k = 1, . . . , n, t y 1 ,...,y m (υ) is a node and t y 1 ,...,y m is the edge from υ to the node if υ is a node and c-t y 1 ,...,y n (υ).
A Mutual Exclusion Protocol (Ticket)
The pseudo-code executed by each process i :
Critical section; cs: turn := turn + 1;
• Initially, each process is at label l1, tvm is 0, turn is 0 and ticket[i] is 0 for each i.
OTS S Ticket Modeling Ticket
• O Ticket {tvm : Υ → Nat, turn : Υ → Nat, ticket i:Pid : Υ → Nat,
An Invariant (Candidate) wrt S Ticket One desired property Ticket should satisfy is the mutual exclusion property, which informally means that there is always at most one process in the critical section.
The property is expressed as 
Maude
• An alg spec lang & sys, mainly developed at SRI Int'l & UIUC.
-A member of the OBJ language family.
• State machines as well as data types.
-Data types are specified in initial algebras.
-State machines are specified in rewriting logic.
• A spec : a sig (sorts & ops decls) & a set of eqs and/or rewriting rules -Functions on data types are defined in equations.
-Transitions of state machines are defined in rewriting rules.
• Equipped with model checking facilities.
Two Ways of Model Checking
1. The command search finds states that are reachable from a given state and satisfy some coditions. It can be used to find counterexamles showing that state machines do not satisfy invariant properties.
2. The LTL model checker checks if a state machine satisfies a property written in LTL.
For both ways,
• Inductive data types can be used freely.
-No need to encode complex data types in basic data types.
• The state space of a state machine does not have to be finite.
-The LTL model checker requires the reachable state space to be finite.
-The command search even does not so.
• The performance is comparable to SPIN. 
BMC with the Command search
• The older versions of Maude did not provide any BMC functionalities.
• Even in the latest version Maude 2.3, the LTL model checker does not provide any BMC functionalities.
• In the latest version Maude 2.3, however, the command search has an optional argument n stating the maximum depth of the search.
For an OTS S and υ 0 ∈ I, search searches the n-bounded reachable states in the transition tree made from S and υ 0 for a counterexample showing that S does not satisfy an invariant property.
Since properties we take into account are invariant properties only, the command search can be used for our purpose.
Instantiation of the Numbers of Entities
• Even if d is finite, w may not be finite and then R ≤d S may not be finite.
• To make it possible for the command search to make an exhautive search for R ≤d S , w should be finite.
A transition tree wrt S depth d width w
To this end, the numbers of some entities such as processes have to be finite. Such instantiation should be made to write state machines in Maude, precisely to write initial states, although transitions can be mostly written in Maude independent of the numbers of entities.
The signature is as follows: When the number of processes is 2, the initial state is written as follows: 
Bounded Model Checking S Ticket
• When the maximum depth n of the search is 6 (or more), the command search finds a counterexample showing that S Ticket does not satisfy the mutual exclusion property.
• When n is 5 or less, no counterexamples are found.
• But, what if the 6-bounded reachable state space were too large to be exhaustively traversed within a reasonable time?
-the state explosion problem.
-Some possible solutions to the problem have been proposed such as use of abstraction.
-We propose another possible solution to the problem, which uses mathematical induction.
CafeOBJ
• An alg spec lang & sys, mainly developed at JAIST.
-State machines are specified in hidden algebras.
• A spec : a signature (sort & operator decls) & a set of eqs.
-Both functions and transitions are defined in equations.
• Used as a proof assistant.
Necessary Lemmas
Given an OTS S and a state predicate p : Υ → Bool, state predicates are called necessary lemmas for ∀υ : R S . p(υ) if the state predicates are needed to prove ∀υ : R S . p(υ) and are also invariant wrt S when p is invariant wrt S.
• Given an OTS S and a state predicate p : Υ → Bool, necessary lemmas for ∀υ : R S . p(υ) can be systematically constructed.
• It may be hard to prove necessary lemmas invariant wrt S.
Necessary lemmas must be often strengthened to make good lemmas.
• Necessary lemmas are appropriate for falsification.
Let N L S,p be the set of all necessary lemmas for ∀υ : R S . p(υ).
A Way to Construct Necessary Lemmas
Suppose that ∀υ : R S . p(υ) is proved by induction on the structure of R S .
• In invariant verification with CafeOBJ, the main task is case splitting.
Each case is represented by a set of equations.
For each induction case, the case is split into sub-cases such that a formula to prove in the induction case reduces to either true or false.
• For a sub-case such that the formula reduces to false where E is the set of equations that represents the sub-case,
¬( e∈E e) is a necessary lemma for ∀υ : R S . p(υ).
CafeOBJ Specification of S Ticket
The signature is as follows: 
An Example of Constructing Necessary Lemmas
A Fragment of the proof of ∀υ :
open ISTEP --arbitrary values op k : -> Pid . --assumptions eq pc(s,k) = l3 . eq ticket(s,k) = turn(s) . eq (i = k) = false . eq j = k . eq pc(s,i) = cs . --successor state eq s' = enter(s,k) . --enter red istep1(i,j) . close By substituting j for k in the 5 eqs that characterize the sub-case and replacing constants s, i and j with variables S, I and J, the following necessary lemma is constructed: eq inv2(S,I,J) = not(pc(S,J) = l3 and ticket(S,J) = turn(S) and not(I = J) and pc(S,I) = cs) .
Falsification of ∀υ : R S Ticket . MX(υ) by Induction
Only induction on the structure of R S Ticket can be used to find a counterexample of ∀υ : R S Ticket . MX(υ). 
Ongoing and Future Work (1)
• Neither Ticket nor NSPK can demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed solution.
This is because only BMC can find counterexamples showing that Ticket does not satisfy the mutual exclusion property and that NSPK does not satisfy the secrecy property.
• We are planning to apply the proposed solution to the iKP electronic payment protocol.
We found in an ad-hoc way a counterexample showing that iKP does not satisfy a property called the payment agreement property.
We believe that only BMC cannot find such a counterexample, but the proposed solution can systematically find such a counterexample.
